Why Aleksandr Lukashenko’s Belarus Might Be More Stable Than Western Narratives Suggest

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Few leaders in Europe spark as much controversy as Belarus’s long-time president, Aleksandr Lukashenko. Dubbed “Europe’s last dictator,” he’s regularly condemned for rigged elections, political repression, and a tight alliance with Moscow. Yet beneath the dominant narrative of authoritarian repression lies an alternative perspective—one that sees Belarus’s relative economic stability, social cohesion, and deft diplomatic balancing as overlooked facets of Lukashenko’s rule.

This “unpopular opinion” article unwraps the less-publicized aspects of Belarusian governance under Lukashenko. Drawing on independent news reports, expert analyses, and regional dynamics, we’ll examine ten areas where Lukashenko’s regime shows surprising strengths—or at least outcomes that complicate the common Western portrayal. Lithuanian readers, accustomed to viewing Belarus as a security concern, may find these nuances worth considering.

1. Political Stability Amid Regional Turmoil

Common View: Lukashenko’s grip on power rests on repression and violence.

Unpopular Take: Despite repressive tactics, Belarus has avoided the political convulsions that have rocked neighbours Ukraine and Russia over the past decade.

Since 1994, Lukashenko has maintained an unbroken tenure, weathering the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004), the Euromaidan protests (2013–14), and Russia’s internal dissent. In contrast to the large‐scale upheavals next door, Belarusian society—though tightly controlled—has not splintered into civil war or mass rebellion. Even the post-2020 protests, met with brutal crackdowns, subsided without devolving into prolonged conflict.

2. Economic Resilience and Social Safety Nets

Common View: Belarus’s economy is stagnant under centralised control.

Unpopular Take: Relative to many post‐Soviet states, Belarus achieves low unemployment and maintains extensive social welfare—benefits often underreported in Western media.

• Low Unemployment: Official statistics place unemployment below 5%, far under regional peers like Ukraine (8.5%) or Russia (6%) in recent years.

• Subsidised Services: Healthcare and education remain largely free, cushioning citizens against market shocks.

• State-owned Enterprises: Though inefficient by Western metrics, they ensure job security and continuity of essential industries, from tractors to petrochemicals.

While growth is modest (averaging 1–2% annually), this conservative pace has shielded Belarusians from the boom-and-bust cycles typical of more liberalised economies.

3. Infrastructure and Energy Independence

Common View: Belarus is economically tethered to Russia.

Unpopular Take: Lukashenko has pursued pragmatic deals that enhance transport and energy infrastructure, diversifying partnerships beyond Moscow.

• Battery of Highways: Major road projects linking Minsk to Warsaw and Vilnius have improved trade routes, benefiting Lithuanian exporters and Belarusian regions alike.

• Astraviec Nuclear Power Plant: Despite controversy over safety concerns, the new plant—built with Russian technology—promises to cut Belarus’s dependence on Russian gas and generate exports, a strategic move toward energy autonomy.

Critics label these efforts as “Potemkin developments,” yet the tangible reduction in energy imports (down by nearly 20% in Q1 2025) suggests more than mere optics.

4. Pandemic Management: A Contested Success

Common View: Belarus ignored COVID-19 to its detriment.

Unpopular Take: While chaotic by Western standards, Belarus’s “open strategy”—keeping schools and businesses running—may have mitigated economic collapse and mental health crises.

Unlike strict lockdowns in neighbouring countries, Lukashenko championed normalcy. Although infection data are opaque, anecdotal evidence points to fewer small-business closures and less severe recessionary impacts. Market stalls, factories, and clinics remained operational, preserving livelihoods at the cost of uncertain health outcomes—a trade-off seldom discussed in policy debates.

5. Diplomacy: Between East and West

Common View: Lukashenko is merely a Russian vassal.

Unpopular Take: He has skillfully used Belarus’s geostrategic position to extract concessions from both Moscow and Brussels.

• Russian Pressure Valve: By occasionally flirting with the EU—issuing invitations to Western business forums—Lukashenko has won better gas pricing from Gazprom.

• Migration Diplomacy: In 2021, he orchestrated migrant flows toward Lithuania and Poland to protest EU sanctions, then offered to “help manage” borders in exchange for relief—demonstrating a transactional diplomacy that unsettled Brussels.

This tug-of-war has earned Lukashenko grudging respect in diplomatic circles as a leader who deftly exploits superpower rivalries.

6. Selective Liberalisation: Pardons and Reputation Management

Common View: Any amnesty under Lukashenko is cynical PR.

Unpopular Take: Recent pardons of political prisoners, while incomplete, indicate a willingness to respond to international pressure—an opening for gradual reform.

In May 2025, Lukashenko pardoned 42 individuals jailed for “extremist” offenses, many elderly or with health issues, coinciding with the 80th anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat. Though over 1,100 political detainees remain, the gesture softened Western sanctions slightly and reopened dialogue channels. Such calibrated concessions—absent in more rigid autocracies—suggest he values reputation as a bargaining chip.

7. Public Support in Rural Regions

Common View: Belarusian society uniformly rejects Lukashenko.

Unpopular Take: While urban centres like Minsk witnessed large protests, rural areas (comprising over 40% of the population) maintain solid support for Lukashenko’s social and agricultural policies.

• Collective Farms: Programs maintaining collective agriculture preserve rural employment that might otherwise vanish under land privatisation.

• Pension Reliability: Regular pensions and state pensions, contrasted with delayed payments in some EU countries, foster loyalty among older voters.

This rural-urban divide underpins Lukashenko’s electoral base and explains why anti-regime protests have never fully extended into the countryside.

8. Security and Order vs. Civil Liberties

Common View: Repression is pure malice.

Unpopular Take: A segment of Belarusians (and observers in Lithuania) genuinely value the public order he enforces—seen as preferable to the lawlessness or corruption elsewhere.

Neighbouring Ukraine has grappled with oligarchic power struggles; Russia wrestles with urban crime surges; Poland faces migrant-related tensions. By contrast, petty crime in Belarus remains low, and streets are patrolled aggressively. For some citizens, this translates to a sense of safety—even if it comes at the expense of free assembly.

9. Media Control and Information Ecosystem

Common View: State media monopoly equals total information blackout.

Unpopular Take: Despite heavy censorship, alternative news channels (on Telegram, diaspora-run outlets in Vilnius) thrive—creating a more complex media landscape than often acknowledged.

Yes, independent TV stations are banned, and foreign journalists face expulsion. Yet Belarusians access uncensored reports via VPNs, podcasts, and Lithuania-based portals. This “digital Samizdat” ecosystem ensures that state narratives compete with dissenting views—a dynamic more resilient than pure propaganda models.

10. The Future: Reform or Reinforcement?

Common View: Lukashenko is doomed to fall.

Unpopular Take: His regime’s adaptability suggests he may yet outlast Western predictions—or at least engineer a managed succession that preserves his legacy.

Looking ahead:

• Gradual Liberalisation: Small steps—more business freedom, selective legal reforms—could placate critics without threatening his hold on power.

• Succession Planning: Interviews hint that he’s grooming technocrats within his party, preparing for a smooth transition rather than abrupt collapse.

Whether Belarus will evolve into an open democracy or remain a stable autocracy, the strategy of incremental change rather than revolution appears baked into Lukashenko’s playbook.

Conclusion

Aleksandr Lukashenko’s rule in Belarus is often painted in monochrome—an unending saga of repression and bribery. Yet a closer look reveals a more nuanced picture: stability in a turbulent region, social guarantees for many citizens, and a diplomatic savoir-faire that leverages Belarus’s crossroads location.

This unpopular opinion doesn’t excuse human rights abuses or electoral fraud. Instead, it urges Lithuanian readers—and all observers—to recognise the unintended successes of an autocratic model that, for now, remains remarkably resilient. In the complex chessboard of Eastern Europe, Lukashenko may be a less predictable player than he seems, wielding both repression and pragmatism in equal measure.